This paper provides a review of the telecommunications policy of the European Union. We discuss the motivations for the Commission's regulatory choices and provide some evidence on their performance. We …nd that the outcome of the …rst regulatory period varied signi…cantly between member states, re ‡ecting the numerous implementation choices that were left at their consideration. The recent reform of the regulation addresses some of the past shortcomings, but still poses some risks for technological neutrality.
Introduction
The liberalization of telecommunications services is one of the most ambitious reforms implemented by the European Commission, as part of its goal of ensuring competition in the internal market. It aims at the reform of an industry which represents around 2.6% of EU-15 value added. Moreover, if the reform succeeds in improving the telecommunications infrastructure it is likely to spur productivity gains for the whole economy.
Liberalization is not an easy task. The strong technological changes that motivated the reforms in the …rst place, pose some challenging issues regarding the proper regulatory framework that should govern the transition to competition. The success or failure of the liberalization strategy is very important for future policy, since the telecommunications approach has been replicated, with minor di¤erences, in the liberalization of other network industries.
In the present paper we review this liberalization strategy and provide an analysis of its performance. We argue that, in the design of the liberalization process, the Commission had to determine the scope of the necessary ex-ante intervention and to ensure market integration, while at the same time creating a framework ‡exible enough to accommodate the convergence of communication technologies. Section 2 reviews the …rst set of measures adopted by the Commission, which formed the "1998 framework" and dealt mainly with the …rst two requirements: the degree of ex-ante intervention and market integration. The outcome of this …rst framework varied signi…cantly between member states, re ‡ecting the numerous implementation choices that were left at their consideration.
Section 3 discusses the revision and amendment of the "1998 framework", which gave birth to the "New Electronic Communications Framework" in 2003. The major amendments were motivated by the growing convergence of communication technologies, which suggested the need for a more technology-neutral approach to regulation.
The new framework was also used to tackle with new instruments the main goals already considered in 1998. First, through the introduction of criteria that would determine, as competition developed in the industry, the gradual move from ex-ante intervention towards ex-post control by means of competition policy. Secondly, the objective of market integration was also reinforced by the introduction of provisions pushing towards more harmonized rules. Nevertheless, the concern remains that the old technology-speci¢ c regulation will linger through the de…nition of relevant product markets that are too narrow or geographical markets that are too wide in scope. The higher level of harmonization sought by the Commission also risks losing the bene…ts of regulatory experimentation, which may not be negligible at a time when new generation networks are being deployed.
The liberalization process up to 2003: introducing competition
The need for a set of regulations to control the liberalization of telecoms is explained by the particular characteristics de…ning the industry. The most relevant of these are the existence of signi…cant scale and scope economies within and between the di¤erent segments, as well as vertical economies and network e¤ects (Armstrong (1997) ). In this context, e¤ective competition cannot be achieved by merely removing any exclusive right in those segments in which competition is considered possible. At least in the early stages of liberalization, some ex-ante regulation is needed to open the market while ensuring that entrants are not penalized by any legacy or …rst-mover advantage of incumbents.
The European Union's Telecommunications Policy starts in 1984, with the necessary harmonization of technical standards across Member States and the agreement on a common position in the international telecommunications arena. Nevertheless, it is not until 1987 when the main provisions governing the liberalization process began to be discussed. Through 1987 to 1998, the Commission set the rules that ought to be transposed to national legislation (or to be directly applied by Member States) before 1998, year in which all the telecommunication markets were o¢ cially liberalized. This set of Directives and Regulations, which we name "the 1998 framework", were intended to gradually move the sector from monopoly to competition and were in place until 2003, when they were amended to cope with the convergence of technologies.
Nevertheless, increased competition was not the sole objective behind the "1998 framework". As it is common to other network industries that were liberalized during the same period, the liberalization process is characterized by the additional requirement of market integration. The European Commission chose its market J. Gual, S. Jodar-Rosell integration strategy so as to satisfy the need for some ex-ante regulation (to ensure e¤ective entry) and the requirement of a level playing …eld. This strategy can be termed, after Gual (2008) , "Host country rules within limits". Essentially, it amounted to identifying the minimal set of conduct and structure regulations for competition to emerge and impose it to Member States. These de…ned the "limits" in the integration strategy. The speci…c implementation of those regulations was left to Member States, hence the quali…cation of "Host country rules".
The approach taken by the Commission, though well targeted to address all the sources of concern, left too much scope for discretion to Member States. As a result of this, it will be shown at the end of this section that the outcome of the "1998 framework" is mixed and varies signi…cantly between countries.
The Commission' s concerns and measures to protect nascent competition
In any network industry, the transition to competition cannot be achieved just by allowing for free entry to the market. The initial market structure is often characterized by the existence of a vertically integrated multiproduct monopoly. In this setting, the incumbent enjoys a …rst-mover advantage over potential entrants and its pricing structure usually involves cross-subsidies across the di¤erent services. Hence, the liberalization strategy must take into account the e¤ects of these two issues on emerging competition. First, it should minimize the e¤ect of any …rst-mover advantage on the entrants ability to compete. And second, it also needs to make sure that prices charged by the incumbent truly re ‡ect the expected pro…tability for the entry decision. Moreover, there is the need to address the competition problems that are likely to appear in the form of abuses of dominant position. Although the latter can be subject to ex-post regulation by competition authorities, the European Commission believes that ex-post intervention would not prevent irremediable damage to entrants.
The directives and regulations of the "1998 framework" can thus be grouped according to the type of concern they intend to address:
Ensuring e¢ cient entry Exclusive and special rights were obviously the main barriers to entry into the industry. For competition to emerge, it was necessary to J. Gual, S. Jodar-Rosell remove these rights and to implement, instead, a system of general authorizations with minimum compliance requirements. Of course, these requirements can always be used strategically by governments, specially if they (partially) own the incumbent or if they have strong preferences for national champions. Transparent and objective rules may minimize this risk. The harmonization of these rules across Member States is thus essential to satisfy the objective of market integration.
A second concern is to ensure that entry occurs where it is e¢ cient. For this to happen, entrants must be able to correctly assess, for each of the business segments, their expected pro…ts in case of entry. Unfortunately, the regulated prices of the monopoly period convey little information on expected pro…tability under competition. Relative prices between business segments are usually distorted either by direct regulation or by the universal service regulations imposed to the incumbent.
Allowing entry under such conditions may trigger excessive entry in some segments (Crandall, (2005) ) while potentially e¢ cient competitors are kept out of the market in others.
The European Commission addressed both issues by gradually abolishing exclusive rights in those segments less subject to tari¤ distortions 1 and encouraging tari¤ rebalancing in the public voice telephony segment. Member States were also encouraged to establish national schemes to share the cost of Universal Service Obligations (USO) among all the players in the market 2 . The date for the …nal liberalization of the public voice telephony segment was established in the so called "Full Competition Directive" 3 , which set it for January 1998 (with some extensions for small and less developed networks requiring further structural adjustments). Finally, to ensure the objectiveness, harmonization and transparency of the requirements imposed to potential entrants in the provision of voice services, the Commission issued the "Liberalization Directive" 4 limiting the scope of possible requirements and the procedure to be followed in the granting of licences. The risk of tipping the market substantially decreases if interconnection between all the networks is made mandatory. This was done by the European Commission in its "Interconnection Directive" 6 , which regulated the obligation to interconnect at nondiscriminatory and cost oriented prices. In particular, incumbents were required to publish reference o¤ers and to "provide interconnection facilities and information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as they provide for their own services". Moreover, in order to decrease switching costs, number portability -that is, the possibility to keep the phone number when changing provider -and carrier pre-selection were mandated shortly after 7 .
Preventing the abuse of the incumbent' s dominant position While competition is not su¢ ciently developed, incumbents can abuse their dominant position in several ways. First, incumbents control an essential input for entrants, namely the subscriber's access. In the absence of ex-ante regulation, the incumbent could squeeze the entrants'margins by distorting retail prices and interconnection rates.
Secondly, interconnection prices could also be used to leverage his dominant position to adjacent markets and preventing …rms in those markets to o¤er bundles of both products. Finally, if regulated and liberalized activities coexist, pro…ts from the regulated activities can be used to cross-subsidize prices in the competitive ones in order to drive entrants out of the market. Given the strong network e¤ects and switching costs, a successful foreclosure of the markets to new entrants may be di¢ cult to overturn by an ex-post intervention.
5 For a comprehensive review of the sources and consequences of switching costs and network e¤ects see Farrell and Klemperer (2006 Besides all these provisions, a very signi…cant step in European telecoms regulation was the introduction of local loop unbundling (LLU) in order to further increase competition in local access 9 . According to this regulation, undertakings with SMP are obliged to provide access at a regulated price to the physical copper pair that connects the network termination point at the subscriber's premises to the main distribution frame or equivalent facility. This is considered the least replicable facility and, hence, the main bottleneck for the emergence of competition.
Scope left to Member States and its e¤ects
The approach taken by the Commission, as it has been said, consisted in imposing a minimal set of regulations while leaving to Member States the implementation details and the freedom to impose additional measures. In particular, the Commission was neutral on issues of public ownership and vertical separation of the incumbent. The
Member States' individual position with regards to these two issues, along with di¤erences in the degree of independence of the NRA and in the delays incurred in the adoption of the commission's directives, caused signi…cant di¤erences in the regulation of telecoms at the national level. Moreover, the regulations proposed in the "1998 framework" were su¢ ciently vague to leave Member States scope for discretion in implementing them. Table 1 The regulation of access to the infrastructure is another source of divergences and discretionality. Although Commission directives required that interconnection and access rates had to be based on costs, leaving a fair return on investment, they did not specify the methodologies to compute neither the costs nor the level of fair returns. A number of countries opted for an accounting approach and used fully distributed costs (FDC), a concept which is not related to marginal cost, since it takes into account all the costs of the …rm and not only those incurred in case of expanding output (or services). Moreover, since it is assessed at historic prices, it may yield too high estimates if new technologies are more e¢ cient. A second possibility, based on economic costs, is to use long-run incremental costs (LRIC). LRIC provide the right incentives for entry (Vogelsang (2003) ) but are very complex to compute and may incentivize non-price forms of exclusion, such as quality degradation, if the …xed economic costs of the service are not taken into account (La¤ont and Tirole (2000) ). Finally, an alternative to cost-based regulation is given by the use of the e¢ cient component-pricing rule (ECPR). A sophisticated ECPR can be close to the Ramsey-optimal price structures that a policy maker should implement in order to encourage e¢ cient entry and network investment, but it is again very information demanding. Hence, a simple version of the ECPR is sometimes used in the form of retail-minus pricing. This approach sets the interconnection or access price at (1-x)% the retail price, where the x should account for the marginal cost of retail minus any additional cost directly attributed to the provision of the access or interconnection service.
Line of business restrictions may be required to ensure that the incumbent does not alter interconnection terms to leverage its dominant position to adjacent markets (i.e.
in the mobile communications). They may also be needed to ensure he does not try to protect his dominant position in the relevant market by delaying the deployment of new networks or softening facilities-based competition (i.e. competition from cable-TV providers). Legal separation is a mild form of achieving this, the most e¤ective way being complete divestiture or ownership restrictions. Nevertheless, this last form of separation can be ine¢ cient if there are signi…cant scope economies.
Finally, retail price regulation is commonly done in the form of price caps applied to a basket of services. Di¤erences between countries in this case are con…ned to the power of the incentives to reduce costs.
Results at the end of this stage
Successful competition is expected to drive prices down, expand the range of products available to consumers and improve incumbents'e¢ ciency levels, among other bene…ts. A quick look at some of these performance variables back in 2003 shows that achieving these goals was not an easy task. After 16 years of directives and recommendations and 5 years after the o¢ cial liberalization of the …xed telephony market, the results of the "1998 framework" were somewhat mixed. Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix provide a broad summary of the performance of each of the EU-15
countries. In what follows, we review the main conclusions that can be derived from their analysis.
The improvement of the incumbents' overall e¢ ciency levels constitutes the main success of the framework. As data from the OECD reveals (see …gure 1), the num- The "1998 framework" had less remarkable results in the broadband segment. Most countries experienced important price reductions in monthly fees, but their magnitude seems to depend on speci…c rules that were not determined by the framework and which di¤ered between member states. In particular, as …gure 2 shows, price reductions were larger (and the incumbents' market shares were lower) in those countries where the incumbent did not own cable assets. Moreover, despite these price cuts, average broadband penetration in the EU-15 was quite low (7.1%) by
2003, compared to those non-EU OECD countries who had launched DSL around the same period or later (Korea, 24.2%; Switzerland, 10.1%; or Norway, 8%).
The role of the "1998 framework" in the introduction of e¤ective competition in conventional telephony was even more disappointing. Although the market had ex- The fact that a common framework leads to these mixed and heterogeneous results across countries could be explained by the great variety of policies that were …nally applied in practice. The pattern exhibited by …xed telephony prices and e¢ ciency, for example, seems to be more the result of the price incentive schemes implemented by each national government than the result of competitive pressure arising from new entrants. Similarly, the observed price reductions in the broadband segment suggest that national preferences towards line of business restrictions determine the level of competition that arises in the market.
In addition to these policies, the literature has identi…ed other possible explanations The establishment of a national regulatory authority is another commonly analyzed feature and it is also generally found to yield positive results. Estache et al (2006) …nd that a NRA reduces prices (specially in developed countries open to competition), increases the quality of the service and improves labour productivity. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the characteristics of the NRA also have an in ‡uence on performance. On the one hand, Wallsten (2003) …nds that the in-troduction of the NRA prior to the privatization process is associated with higher penetration (in …xed and mobile segments) and telecommunications investment. In addition, this sequencing also seems to increase the investors'willingness to pay at the privatization stage, which is interpreted as investors giving more value to environments with clearer rules. On the other hand, the degree of independence of the NRA with respect to the government also seems to matter. This …nding is of particular relevance for the European case, since the creation of a NRA was mandated for all countries but its degree of independence largely varied from one to another (see …gure 6). Edwards and Waverman (2006) …nd that a higher regulatory independency, as measured by an index of several institutional features of NRAs, yields lower interconnection rates and mitigates the positive e¤ect of public ownership on those rates. Using a slightly di¤erent index, Gual and Trillas (2006) …nd a weak negative e¤ect of regulatory independence on labour productivity, while its e¤ect on penetration is not signi…cant.
Line of business restrictions, the extension of privatization or the independence of NRAs constitute important pieces of regulation that were not contemplated in the "1998 framework". Nevertheless, the framework considered other rules that could also contribute to the heterogeneity of its success due to di¤erences in their implementation or in the timing of their adoption.
Member states di¤ered, for example, in the year of adoption of policies that favour entrants vis a vis incumbents -such as carrier pre-selection, number portability or local loop unbundling. Gual and Trillas (2006) provide some indication on the e¤ects of such policies on penetration and productivity. These policies are all aggregated into an index, with higher values re ‡ecting more favorable entry conditions. Proentrant policies are found to increase penetration but to have nonsigni…cant e¤ects on labour productivity.
As could be seen in tables 1 and 2, member states also di¤ered on the costing methodology used for interconnection regulation. Chang et al (2003) …nd that most countries using some form of direct cost-based interconnection had telecommunications investments above the EU average in 1997. Similarly, most of the countries not using fully-distributed costs had investments above the EU average. No signi…cant results are found for long-run incremental cost methodologies.
Finally, di¤erences in the pricing of access to the infrastructure needed for broadband provision could also explain some of the observed variance in broadband penetra-tion. It is generally accepted 11 that facilities-based competition is more e¤ective than service-based competition in promoting the adoption of broadband technologies (Aron and Burnstein (2003) , Distaso et al (2004) ). Service-based competition can promote the early adoption of the technology, but it may decrease its di¤usion speed (Denni and Gruber (2006) ). The level and relative prices of the di¤erent forms of access to the infrastructure -local loop, bitstream, etc -determine the optimal choice for a broadband provider between a facilities-or service-based provision of the service. Hence, the rulings of NRAs with regards to access prices can in ‡uence broadband adoption by favouring one form of service provision over the other. Besides these rules, the dominant form of access provision in a country also depends on the initial coverage of cable networks and the existence of cross-ownership restrictions. Again, these are factors that vary between member states and which were outside the scope of the framework.
Public ownership in 1998 The role for ex-ante regulation seems to be con…ned then to ensure the interconnection of all networks and the fairness of switching costs for the consumers. Indeed, too much ex-ante regulation is not without risk in this converged environment. First of all, the e¤ects of ex-ante regulation in one market are easily translated to adjacent product markets. Hence, its overall e¤ects are hard to establish, increasing the risk of regulating related markets. Secondly, asymmetric regulation may put some …rms at disadvantage unless the motivations for concern are very well founded. Finally, regulation of access to networks has to be carefully designed since there is the risk of discouraging investment in more e¢ cient networks such as next generation networks (NGNs).
The new strategy of the European Commission
Recognizing this converging process, the European Commission made a move towards a more technology-neutral regulation of telecommunication markets in 2003.
The "1998 framework" was abandoned in favour of the "New Electronic Communications Framework", which extends the harmonized minimal set of regulations to communication networks (and services provided over these networks) irrespective of the type of information they convey 12 . In short, the telecommunications market now becomes the electronic communications market (ECM).
The overall approach still follows the "host country rules within limits" of the "1998 framework", with the di¤erence that competition policy principles and ex-post regulation take an increased role and there is a higher harmonization e¤ort on the minimal set of rules: Besides listing explicitly the set of measures to be implemented, the Commission took additional steps to ensure that similar regulations were imposed in countries facing similar situations. In particular, NRAs are required to submit their intended regulations to public consultation and to inform the Commission about them. Moreover, in the case of transnational markets, NRAs are required to cooperate. Nevertheless, the most signi…cant measure adopted by the Commission is 16 Among these objectives, it stands out that of "ensuring that users, including disabled users, derive maximum bene…t in terms of choice, price, and quality". the Framework Directive, which grants veto power to the Commission on NRAs decisions with respect to market de…nition and the designation of undertakings with SMP. Hence, the Commission may overturn any decision of NRA in these …elds if it considers that it is contrary to Community Law or to the objectives set on the above mentioned Article 8. After the …rst revision of the "new framework", the Commission is considering whether to extend the veto power to the particular regulations applied by NRAs and entrust a common European regulator with the task of monitoring these remedies 17 .
Measures to reduce the scope left to member states Relative to the "1998 framework", the "new framework" includes some measures to reduce the scope that was left to member states with respect to line of business restrictions, structural separation and entry regulations. To begin with, legal separation of cable TV and other public electronic communications networks is required when these three conditions are met: a) the undertaking is controlled by a member state or bene…ts from special rights; b) is found to be dominant in some relevant market and c) operates a cable TV network established under special or exclusive rights 18 . Secondly, the same directive also requires member states to ensure that any vertically integrated undertaking with SMP does not (price or non-price) discriminate in favour of their own activities. Since price discrimination is already banned by the Access and Interconnection Directive 19 , this requirement may be a way to introduce some degree of vertical separation. Indeed, the Commission is considering whether to give regulators mandatory powers to impose this form of separation 20 . Finally, the "new framework" also requires the provision of electronic communication network or services to be subject to a general authorization and not licensed. With the revision of the "new framework", this would also extend to mobile communications and the possibility of a secondary market for spectrum is under consideration. 
The risks of the new framework
The appearance of the "new framework" recognizes the increased role that competition policy can play in this converged environment. Nevertheless, when put into practice the concern remains on whether it tackles the risks of ex-ante regulation in an appropriate manner. Furthermore, the higher level of harmonization sought by the Commission may provide for market integration but only at the expense of experimentation.
With respect to the …rst issue, the technological neutrality of the "new framework" and, hence, the symmetry in the ex-ante regulation hinges on the de…nition of relevant markets. A good de…nition is important since obligations imposed to operators with SMP run the risk of becoming equivalent to technology-speci…c regulation. This is even more determinant if one takes into account that one of the most significant obligations on SMP undertakings is granting access to their network. The list of relevant markets considered for ex-ante regulation by the Commission does not include any true converged market. Instead, it closely mimics the division according to technologies that was in place during the old framework (Gual (2004) ). Retail provision of voice and data, for example, is separated into two di¤erent markets even though these services are increasingly o¤ered in bundles. The same can be said about the provision of …xed and mobile communications. The Commission justi…es this approach by the present demand conditions. Nevertheless, the revised framework will enter into force around 2010 and will be in place for several years. It is very likely that demand conditions will evolve in the meantime.
Certainly, the list of markets proposed by the Commission can be modi…ed by NRAs to include broader or narrower markets. By doing this, the di¤erent evolution of demand conditions across countries can be taken into account. Similarly, NRAs can in principle de…ne the geographic scope of a market to be smaller than the whole member state territory. This is particularly relevant for the identi…cation of SMP operators in wholesale markets for access, since it would allow the NRAs to recognize the competitive constraints placed by facilities-based competitors in those areas in which their networks are already deployed (Cave (2007) ). Indeed, the UK has just followed this path with the de…nition of sub-national markets for wholesale broadband access. These markets re ‡ect di¤erent competitive conditions -identi…ed mainly by the number of principal operators and the population that can be served -at di¤erent local exchanges 21 .
So far, however, most NRAs have only rede…ned markets in order to narrow them to the speci…c technology predominant in their country 22 . In any case, should a NRA wish to rede…ne a proposed relevant market, his decision is subject to the veto power of the Commission by the application of Article 7. Given the preferences of the Commission in favour of the proposed relevant product markets, as well as its cautionary look at sub-national geographical markets, the existence of this veto power could create uncertainty with respect to the rules set by the NRA.
The Commission's de…nition of relevant markets is also very related to the concern that arises regarding its position with respect to new generation networks (NGN).
In the revision of the "new framework", the Commission states:
"The use of more e¢ cient technology to provide existing regulated services does not alter the justi…cation for that regulation; the move to In addition to this, the e¤ect of local loop unbundling regulations over the old, wellknown copper infrastructure is still unclear. Recent studies (Gual and Jodar-Rosell (2008) ) suggest that unbundling may entail a higher level of investment but the e¤ect in terms of broadband adoption is more modest. Moreover, this e¤ect is likely to depend on getting the relative access prices right, which is not an easy task. In any case, unbundling regulations have almost accomplished their goal of enabling new entrants to achieve a solid position, so that they may undertake further network investments. In this sense, extending mandatory access to NGN seems more di¢ cult to justify.
A …nal concern about the new framework arises from the level of harmonization sought by the Commission. Harmonization implies a trade-o¤ between market integration and the bene…ts of regulatory experimentation. Given the risks previously identi…ed, one should not dismiss the potential magnitude of these bene…ts.
Conclusion
To the eyes of the European consumer, the prospects for telecommunications services look promising. Part of this optimism is due to the successes of the Commission's telecommunications policy. Ensuring e¢ cient entry in the industry, through the enforcement of tari¤ rebalancing, has been the …rst of them. The rate rebalancing policy enabled potential entrants to assess properly expected pro…ts, something that was not possible under the old system of regulated tari¤s with its cross-subsidization between business segments. The second success has been the minimization of the risk of market tipping. This was achieved through the mandatory interconnection of networks in non-discriminatory terms and the implementation of regulations aimed at the reduction of switching costs. These measures had the e¤ect of considerably reducing network e¤ects, thereby minimizing the critical network size needed by the entrants to remain in the market. Finally, the third success has been the modernization of price regulation through the use of incentives. This has prevented the abuse of the incumbents'dominant position and it seems also to have boosted their e¢ ciency levels.
However, the assessment of these successes in terms of industry performance variables calls for a more moderate evaluation and shows a wide dispersion across member states. Overall, the regulatory framework that ended in 2003 was not very successful at decreasing the dominance of incumbents or promoting broadband penetration. Moreover, very few countries experienced price decreases in all the business segments after the end of the tari¤ rebalancing period. Several factors are behind these facts. First, member states have di¤ered in their policy stance on public ownership or vertical separation of the incumbent operator, issues on which the Commission has remained silent, except very recently on the separation issue.
Second, the independence of NRAs and the timing of implementation of European directives and regulations also varies considerably across member states. Finally, the regulations proposed by the Commission left member states a signi…cant scope for discretion.
In view of the mixed results at the end of the …rst regulatory framework, the ultimate reasons behind the increased level of competition have to be found in the intense innovation process that has led to the convergence of communication technologies.
Since the early 2000, broadband has evolved to become a vehicle which will enable real competition in the industry, through the entry of strong players from adjacent markets. In this respect, one should worry about any policy that may compromise convergence and, as a consequence, broadband development.
Indeed, competition policy is now placed at the heart of the new regulatory framework, whose scope has been broadened to include all electronic telecommunications technologies. In so doing, the Commission intends to implement an evolving framework, in line with the convergence process, and a consistent application of rules across countries. Hence, NRAs are required to periodically de…ne relevant markets and assess their level of competition, lifting unnecessary ex-ante regulation once an acceptable level of rivalry is reached. Nevertheless, the practice so far has been the de…nition of relevant (product and geographic) markets in the traditional way, with few signals that the framework is moving towards a more dynamic assessment of market boundaries. Thus, the status quo has changed little and we risk ending up with players constrained by di¤erent regulations according to the technology they use.
In addition to this, there are still some regulatory features outside the scope of the new framework -such as public ownership of the incumbent and its ownership of cable assets -that hinder broadband development. It is true that mandatory unbundling of the local loop seems to matter more than these features. However,the positive e¤ect of mandatory unbundling should not imply that we can disregard the risks posed by the present regulatory framework with respect to new generation networks. The present unbundling rules apply to an already deployed network whose functioning and potential are quite well understood. Contrary to the simple upgrade of the existing network, the deployment of a NGN comes along with signi…cant changes in the management of the network and the need to rede…ne business models and pricing structures, and to coordinate in new standards. In this respect, the identi…cation of successful competitive strategies will be an evolutionary process that will bene…t considerably from experimentation. This entails substantial risks for the operators and requires a predictable regulatory framework that does not impose the extension and harmonization of unbundling rules. The mandatory unbundling of a network which still has to be deployed and whose properties are not well understood is, in our view, one of the largest risks posed by the new regulatory framework. (a ) N a tio n a l o p e ra to rs o n ly. F ig u re s fo r D e n m a rk a n d th e N e th e rla n d s a re n o t stric tly c o m p a ra b le w ith th e o th e rs sin c e th e y re fe r to th e o p e ra to rs th a t h ave b e e n a llo c a te d g e o g ra p h ic a l nu m b e rs a n d S o u rc e s: O E C D a n d E u ro p e a n C o m m issio n 's Im p le m e nta tio n R e p o rts. Table 4 : Results at the end of the "1998 framework" (II).
